



SC: Security Council

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Issue: The Situation in Mali

TIMUN '25 

Turkish International Model United Nations





eCommittee: United Nations Security Council

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I. Introduction

Mali, a West African nation with a population just over 24 million, is one of the most fragile countries in the Sahel region, facing ongoing challenges in governance, political stability, economic development, and security. Since gaining its independence from France in 1960, Mali has struggled to build legislative governance and combat insurgencies within its nation, often leading to unrest and humanitarian crises. Mali's colonial legacy leaves a dark stain on its progression, having to take a step back from its centralized style of governance and degenerative repercussions.

Over the decades, widespread corruption, weak state institutions, and limited public inclusivity has made it increasingly difficult to engage in parliament and maintain authority, while having to deliver necessities to their public. These infirmities severely exhibited themselves during the 2020 and 2021 political crises, which eventually led to the removal of sitting presidents and the consolidation of power. The following coup d'états left Mali in deep democratic backsliding while the parliament was dissolved and power was in the hands of autocrats of the new junta government.

In the meantime, Mali faced growing threats from Islamist insurgencies in the Northern and Central region that originated as far back as the Mali War. Organizations such as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and ISIS-Sahel had taken advantage of the weak governance in Mali and had expanded their outreach while exploiting minerals and illegally taxing citizens. These groups have carried out attacks on civilians, targeted local authorities, and disrupted economic activity, creating widespread insecurity. Their presence has made it difficult for the government and regional partners to maintain control and ensure the safety of the population.

Although international and regional initiatives, such as UN peacekeeping missions (MINUSMA), the 2015 Algiers Peace Accord, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force, have attempted to restore stability, they have all been relatively unsuccessful, only providing temporary relief. The humanitarian situation remains critical, with millions of Malians displaced and facing food insecurity, limited access to healthcare, and threats to their basic safety.

Understanding Mali's crisis requires examining these interconnected factors, which continue to threaten stability and make long-term recovery a complex and ongoing challenge.



II. Key Vocabulary

Sahel Region: Semi-arid region south of the Sahara Desert

Bamako: Capital city of Mali

Coup d'état: Sudden overthrow of a government by force

Transitional Government / Authority: Temporary governing body intended to guide a return to civilian rule

Authoritarianism: Concentration of power with limited political freedoms

FAMa: Forces Armées Maliennes - Malian Armed Forces

JNIM: Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin - Al-Qaeda affiliate

Al-Qaeda: Global jihadist network

ISIS-Sahel / ISGS: Islamic State in the Greater Sahara

Insurgency / Extremism: Armed rebellion challenging state authority

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): People forced to flee homes but remain in-country

Arbitrary Detention: Arrest without legal justification

Transitional Charter: Legal framework for post-coup government

MINUSMA: UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

Sovereignty Erosion: Reduction in a state's ability to independently govern its territory

Proxy Conflict: When external powers support local actors in a conflict

Governance Vacuum: Areas where the state has no effective authority

Humanitarian-Military Nexus: Intersection of aid provision and security operations

Regime Consolidation: Process by which a new government strengthens control after a takeover

Peace Enforcement vs. Peacekeeping: Enforcement involves active combat; peacekeeping is monitoring/observation



III. Involved Countries and Organizations

Burkina Faso

The West African nation of Burkina Faso shares an extensive border with Mali, deeming it vulnerable and conflicted to border insurgency spillover and sovereignty erosion. Alongside this, Burkina Faso has experienced attacks from groups like JNIM and ISIS-Sahel in the past. Like many other West African states, Burkina Faso also participates in mass regional security attempts and intelligence sharing on Sahelian security.

Niger

As a Northern neighbor and frontline state in the Sahel region, Niger faces security issues and threats from insurgency groups that operate across both borders. Additionally, Niger partakes in a troop deal to the G5 Sahel Joint Forces and operates with Mali to secure its borders.

Algeria

Algeria serves as a mediator in Mali's political crises, arranging cooperation efforts between the government and insurgencies. The nation also supports regional counterterrorism efforts, especially regarding Al-Qaeda affiliates.

Senegal

Senegal is a key diplomatic actor in Mali and a crucial member of ECOWAS. Senegal is an operative in sanction regulations, political dialogue, and transitional governance. Unlike other West African nations, Senegal also supports Mali in humanitarian initiatives for internally displaced people.

Ivory Coast

ECOWAS members who are actively involved in Mali's transitional processes provide mediation and diplomatic support. In addition to providing knowledge to regional peacekeeping and security coordination, they take part in monitoring adherence to political roadmaps and sanctions.

Ghana

ECOWAS member states engaged in Mali's transition offer diplomatic mediation and guidance, contributing expertise to regional security and peacekeeping initiatives while overseeing compliance with political agreements and the enforcement of sanctions.



Nigeria

ECOWAS countries involved in Mali's political transition play a key role in mediating disputes, supporting regional security operations, and ensuring that commitments to political roadmaps and sanctions are properly followed.

United Nations (UN)

Directs peacekeeping efforts, administers humanitarian aid, and supervises diplomatic reactions on a global scale. The UN supports the political transition, keeps an eye on human rights, and helps protect civilians during insurgencies.

United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

Enacts legally enforceable measures that have an impact on Mali, such as MINUSMA mandates and sanctions against people or organizations that threaten stability. carries out high-level diplomacy and supervises adherence to international standards.

UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA)

In Mali, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission supports political processes, keeps an eye out for violations of human rights, protects people, and offers security support. Operating in a difficult environment, MINUSMA must strike a balance between protection and peacekeeping in areas of violence.

ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)

Regional organization that enforces sanctions, manages political conflicts, oversees the shift to civilian rule, and promotes communication between the junta and opposition parties. Additionally, ECOWAS organizes humanitarian and military responses in the region.

African Union (AU)

Participates in high-level mediation, aids in political transitions, and promotes cooperation in regional security. To promote adherence to democratic values, the AU collaborates with the UN and ECOWAS.

European Union (EU)

Offers financial assistance, military training, and humanitarian aid to Malian forces. In order to promote governance and regional stability, EU missions support election observation, security sector reform, and capacity-building.



International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Delivers essential humanitarian relief and protection services to civilians affected by conflict, including displaced populations and those trapped in conflict zones.

World Food Programme (WFP)

Provides emergency food assistance to displaced populations and vulnerable communities in Mali, addressing widespread food insecurity and famine exacerbated by the conflict and climate stress.

France

Operation Barkhane (2014–2022), which targeted JNIM, ISIS-Sahel, and allied militias, was the leader of counterterrorism activities in Mali. supplied Malian forces with logistical assistance and training. After France evacuated the majority of its troops in 2022, other international actors helped to fill the security void.

United States

Gives Malian and regional forces training, logistical support, intelligence, and counterterrorism aid. The United States also plays a role in regional security planning and humanitarian coordination.

Russian Wagner Group

The Malian junta is receiving combat support, protection, and training from private military contractors. Their role is contentious and influences political dynamics in the region, frequently making relations with ECOWAS and France more difficult.

Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)

Formed in 2017 from the merger of several jihadist groups including Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM. JNIM operates in northern Mali (Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu) and central Mali (Mopti, Ségou), carrying out attacks on civilians, government forces, and foreign peacekeepers, while imposing local taxes and controlling territory in areas where the government is weak.

Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS / ISIS-Sahel)

Emerging around 2015–2016 and affiliated with the global Islamic State, ISIS-Sahel operates in the tri-border region of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso (Liptako-Gourma). The group conducts guerrilla-style attacks, kidnappings, assassinations, and occupies remote territories to expand influence.



Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Established in the early 2000s with roots in Algeria, AQIM operates mainly in northern Mali, often overlapping with JNIM. The group engages in kidnappings for ransom, attacks on government forces, smuggling, and recruitment of fighters.

Ansar Dine

Formed in 2011 as a Tuareg Islamist group, Ansar Dine operates in northern Mali, especially Kidal and Timbuktu. It implements strict Sharia law in territories under its control and was a key participant in the 2012 Malian rebellion. It later merged into JNIM.

Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

Split from AQIM in 2011, MUJAO operated in northern Mali and neighboring Sahel regions. The group engaged in kidnappings, attacks on civilians and government forces, and later merged into JNIM in 2017.

Local Ethnic Militias and Self-Defense Groups

Examples include Ganda Koy and militias from the Dogon and Fulani communities. They operate mainly in central Mali (Mopti, Ségou), engaging in ethnic clashes, localized violence, and sometimes interacting, either in conflict or alliance with jihadist groups.

IV. Focused Overview of the Issue

1. Colonial History and Instability in Governance

Mali's governmental issues, constitutional disregard, and military exploitation lies deeply rooted in its colonial past; Imperial France. Mali, like many West African nations, was colonized by the French throughout the 19th century, before eventually gaining its independence in 1960. French Sudan, which was a part of the greater French West Africa Union, included the area that would later be recognized as Mali. Throughout French rule, Mali was exploited for its mineral resources instead of being legislatively secure and well funded. The French primarily focused on Mali's mineral reserves and tax, while also maintaining control over its population for forced labour and slave trade.

The French established a centralized government with colonial administrators, regulating the country with a majority of white oligarchs. The administration frequently assimilated regional leaders, resulting in a corrupt system that threatened regional political systems and government policies. Neither community



empowerment, political reforms, nor the development of long-term bureaucratic capabilities were intended goals of the French rule. Mali consequently inherited state machinery following its independence, leading to an unprepared and heterogeneous populace or guarantee of development.




Image 1: Mali's struggle for stability, GIS Reports

Under imperial rule, Mali's economy was restructured and transformed to suit French interests and power struggles. Infrastructure investments, including as ports and railroads, were made to assist resource extraction rather than promote domestic development, and cash crops, such as cotton and peanuts, were given precedence over the production of local food. Oligarchy and elite control over Malian economic sectors deemed it dependent on external funding, which led to persistent poverty and regional inequality caused by the French neglect for the regional populace.

French segregation amounted to a series of regional challenges for native Malians. Colonial policies proposed numerous ethnic and regional divisions, both due to racial preference and tribal designation. The French were known to favor certain ethnic groups for governmental, educational, or other high-regarded positions, leading to turmoil and grievances between minorities. In Northern Mali, for example, the Tuareg population was largely excluded from political participation and dialogue, leading to long-term conflicts that would later manifest in insurgencies and rising rebellions. This historical marginalization of ethnic and racial groups largely contributed to the enduring difficulty of establishing national cohesion.

Alongside this, colonization in Mali brought many unintended legal conflicts regarding the contrast of customary law, practiced by natives, and civil law, practiced by the French and other European states, often resulting in legislative clashes and misconceptions. As a result of this, post-independence leaders adapted to civil law that was instinctively bureaucratic and detached from local realities. Early in Mali's post-colonial



history, corruption and impunity became ingrained due to a combination of weak enforcement and elite domination of official institutions.

2. Economic and Social Dimensions

Following its independence in 1960, Mali inherited an economy heavily shaped by its predecessor, France: extractive, centralized, and highly export-oriented. This dynamic took a lengthy period of time to evolve and adapt to modern and regional conjectures. However, reliance on foreign aid, inadequate maintained infrastructure, and a lack of administrative ability restricted economic growth. Regional disparities and enduring poverty quickly came to define the Malian state.




Image 2: Growth of the real gross domestic product (GDP) in the Gambia from 1980 to 2030

Mali's economy has historically been dependent on agriculture, a form of income that creates the backbone of Mali's economy by employing 40% of its population. However, due to the deteriorating climate and insufficient agricultural infrastructure, food insecurity has led to crop failures, animal losses, and declining soil fertility. Particularly in Northern and Central Mali, where there is a weak governance, the economic hardship in rural areas has triggered societal conflicts and provided an ideal environment for the recruitment of insurgents.

Despite domestic efforts to bolster Mali's economy, international efforts also turnout unattended. Mali's landlocked geography makes trade increasingly challenging. Mali's reliance on nearby nations for port access restricts trade, lowers competitiveness due to increasing cost, and diminished transportation abilities. The lack of strong infrastructure networks makes it excessively difficult for Mali to bolster its economy via trade.

Poverty has persisted throughout Mali's post-colonial transition and seems inevitable at this stage of time. According to The World Bank, youth unemployment is disproportionately high at more than 40% of



lives below the international poverty line. The increasing poverty has led to a decrease in the access to education, therefore increasing youth disenfranchisement, a lack of social services, and pervasive poverty have all contributed to political discontent and increased vulnerability to extremist beliefs.




Image 3: NOTA TÉCNICA N° 1/2021/CONARE_em_prod/CONARE/DEMIG/SENAJUS/MJ

Economic fragility and social inequality are closely tied to Mali's security challenges. Regions with high unemployment, poverty, and limited state presence are most affected by insurgent activity due to the lack of opportunity in order to sustain a proper form of income. Jihadist groups, including JNIM and ISIS-Sahel, exploit the rising poverty scale, offering financial incentives or social services in exchange for support. This creates a feedback loop: poor economic conditions undermine governance legitimacy, which in turn weakens the state's ability to provide security or counter extremist recruitment.

3. History of Mali's Security, Political Transgressions & Insurgency Dynamics

Mali today stands as one of the most fragile states in the Sahel, its governance and stability undermined by a complex interplay of historical legacies, persistent economic stagnation, social vulnerability, and an escalating security crisis. The convergence of these factors has not only shaped the nation's trajectory since its independence in 1960 but also retaliated in a series of coups, most recently in 2020 and 2021 (as per mentioned in the introduction), followed by the consolidation of military rule Colonel Assimi Goïta.

Mali's political delicacy derives from when the country was incorporated into Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF). The French governance at the time imposed a centralized governance from Dakar, favoring extraction and exploitation over legislation. This made local political participation almost impossible, sparking outrage and unrest as early as the 19th century.



Mali Conflict

City or area under control of

- Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
- Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)
- Ansar Dine Islamists
- Movement for Jihad and Unity in West Africa (MUJWA)
- Rebels of unknown origin
- Claimed by Tuareg rebels at Republic of Azawad
- French air strike
- French troops




Image 4: Impact of Islamist Uprising on Human Capital and Demographics: Evidence from Mali

Islamist insurgencies have grown and adapted to the political and military climate of Mali throughout the decades. Their roots lie in the aftermath of the 2012 uprising, in which armed factions directly drawn to Al-Qaeda, Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took advantage of the collapsing government in Mali. After their victory in Northern Mali, splinter groups consisting of Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) merged, forming Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in 2017. With their growing authority over the region, they built a flexible command structure, gaining the ability to impose taxes, adhere to conflict, and co-opt local elites. JNIM eventually extended their influence beyond Mali's Northern region, integrating themselves within Central Mali.

Meanwhile, the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISIS-Sahel) surfaced, leading to conflicts against JNIM. Similarly in intention but differently in execution, ISIS-Sahel conducted shock raids and occupied territory along the Liptako-Gourma tri-border. While JNIM relies on "governance-lite" strategies, ISIS-Sahel has adopted a more coercive approach, yet both continue to exploit state fragility and porous borders.

Insurgencies usually tended to expand in waves, following conflicts and political dilemmas. Following the Malian War, when Tuareg separatists declared independence in the North under the MNLA, they were displaced by Islamist factions such as AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO. The growing power of the Islamist



insurgencies in the region led to the rapid collapse of state authority, creating a suitable trajectory for jihadists to expand into Northern cities.




Image 5: Debunking the Malian Junta's Claims By the Africa Center for Strategic Studies

This was until a French-led Operation Serval retook key cities like Gao and Timbuktu in 2013. Unfortunately for the French and the Malian government however, the operation didn't eliminate the insurgencies as intended, instead the jihadists dispersed into rural regions of Mali while shifting their focus toward Southern regions of Mali, such as Mopti and Ségou.

The dispersion of the insurgencies enabled them to return to their regional practices of ethnic tension, tax collection, and mineral exploitation. The merging of the factions mentioned into JNIM led to a structure that proposed unity to their campaigns. JNIM thrived in central Mali, where they offered justice and economic regulation in areas where the state was absent. This situation gave rise to a diplomatic miracle, producing a paradoxical mix of sovereignty erosion, governance vacuum, and militant consolidation. During the same time, ISIS-Sahel focused on the tri-border region with Niger and Burkina Faso, spreading their territorial expansion among their borders.

These two jihadist insurgencies, though rivals, collectively spread instability and terror across much of West Africa.

The Malian War had turned Kidal, Gao, Mopti, Ségou, Kayes, and Koulikoro into war zones, threatening the approaches to Bamako itself. Following early 2020, Mali's war turned from a local rebellion into a Sahel-wide insurgency. The UN has provided statistics pointing that the Sahel region now accounts for over half of all global terrorism-related deaths, deeming Mali among the world's most dangerous conflict zones.



Beyond an impoverished state, Mali's governance had been plagued by corruption and authoritarianism. Institutions remained legislatively weak while political elites were regularly charged with embezzling public funds for their own benefits, providing post-colonial efforts did not witness any kind of improvement. As corruption succeeded, in administration, sourcing, and the judiciary, public fumes began to rise.

Among many, the main incident that triggered demonstrations against President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in 2020 was the allegations of widespread corruption. In addition to prevalent nepotism, irregularities in a fractured democratic system, and the inability to deal with the Islamist insurgencies, people took matters into their own hands. A coup d'état against President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was carried out on August 18, 2020, when a number of mid-ranking officers in the Malian Armed Forces staged a mutiny. Northern and Central Mali were experiencing violent insecurity, economic instability, and broad political discontent at the time of the military coup. The coup ultimately led to Keïta's resignation and the dissolution of key state institutions, including the government and the parliament.



Image 6: Mali Blames Western Nation For Failed Coup Attempt

Following the 2020 coup, a second military takeover transpired on May 24, 2021, when Colonel Assimi Goïta unlawfully detained the interim President and Prime Minister of the transitional government. As per usual, Goïta indicated that the civilian leaders had tried to sabotage the stipulated political roadmap and used alleged violations of the transitional charter to justify his actions. In the long run, the coup successfully transitioned Goïta's authority, ignoring legal alternatives and ethical ride-paths and uniting the military power grab. The event highlighted the ongoing destabilization in Mali's government, while also signaling the continuation of an unstable junta-led control.

In 2025, the Malian junta declared an extension of their mandate for an additional five years, narrowing their intentions for a proper democracy to form whilst also breaking their promise of a civil

government. In a thoroughgoing attempt at authoritarianism, the junta-led government dissolved all political entities and parties, effectively eliminating all forms of opposition while maintaining their mandate within their military powerhouse. These actions further destabilized the already fragile nature of Malian governance, eliminating the purist democratic structure that was sought for by the people of Mali. As an indication of the junta's prolonged oversight in Malian politics, its expansion of military authority brought about public unpredictability and strained ties with both local and regional actors. This development points toward the continued difficulties with stability and governance sets the stage for the nation's ongoing security, humanitarian, and sociopolitical crises.

The government’s tightly controlled, authoritarian rule has severely restricted fundamental freedoms, including the right to free speech and democratic participation. These measures have resulted in numerous arbitrary arrests, notably of journalists such as Alfousseini Togo, Yeri Bocoum, Mohamed Youssef Bathily, and Rokiatou Doumbia, who were charged with undermining the state or criticizing the judiciary. Similarly, politicians including Choguel Maïga, Youssef Daba Diawara, Issa Kaou N'Djim, and eleven other opposition members have faced charges related to embezzlement or expressing dissenting political views. These actions pave the way for the junta government to discard democratic principles and operate according to personal beliefs.




Image 7: Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, November 29, 2023: Potential ISSP-JNIM Truce Boosts Salafi-Jihadi Insurgency in the Sahel

The military junta’s arbitrary grip of power has severely deteriorated Mali’s security situation. Islamist military armed forces such as JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), Al-Qaeda, and ISIS-Sahel have increased their dominance over the Shael region.

Response to the coup was rather dramatic, escalating violence as humanitarian struggle, famine, and severe danger for civilian populations sparked, drawing international attention to Mali’s darkening future.



4. Regional and International Implications

The spread of jihadist insurgencies from Mali into Burkina Faso and Niger has transformed the central Sahel into the world's deadliest terror zone. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2024, the Sahel accounted for 43% of all global terrorism deaths, with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger among the five countries with the highest counts of terrorism. As per mentioned, Mali's weak borders and inadequate governance have allowed JNIM and ISIS-Sahel to project violence beyond the country, targeting aid workers, rural communities, and military convoys. Subsequently, the tri-border region (Liptako-Gourma) is essentially ungoverned, resulting in widespread displacement and threatening local economies that rely on farming and herding.




Image 8: Regional Bureau for West and Central Africa Overview - Forcibly Displaced and Stateless Persons (November 2024)

Africa's ever growing displacement crises is constantly being fueled by Malian asylum seekers. Tens of thousands of Malians are being forced to flee into neighboring countries such as Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Niger, while over 400,000 were internally displaced by 2024. The sudden influx of refugees puts additional pressure on host nations that were already vulnerable due to internal insurgencies, poverty, and food insecurity. Armed organizations have frequently targeted humanitarian corridors, creating a Humanitarian-Military Nexus, resulting in violent conflicts between the local population and the refugees.

International parties have been drawn into the Malian issue due to colonial ties or volunteering for humanitarian aid. France first took the lead with Operation Serval (2013) and later Operation Barkhane but as public discontent with the French presence increased, Paris was forced to remove its forces in 2022. In response, Russian influence swiftly filled this void, especially through the Wagner Group (a private mercenary group that carries out military missions), which started assisting the military junta while mining Mali's gold reserves. A significant security void resulted from the UN peacekeeping operation (MINUSMA) being forced to retire in 2023 due to growing antagonism from Malian authorities. Western nations, such as the US and



the EU, must strike a balance between their support for counterterrorism efforts and their worries about violations of human rights by Wagner mercenaries and Malian forces.

V. Important Events & Chronology

Date (Day/Month/Year)	Event
January 17, 2012	The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) launched an armed rebellion against the Malian government, demanding autonomy for northern Mali.
April 6, 2012	The MNLA unilaterally declared the independence of Azawad, encompassing the northern regions of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. This declaration was not internationally recognized.
January 11, 2013	France launched Operation Serval in response to the rapid advance of Islamist militant groups in northern Mali, including Ansar Dine and MOJWA.
April 25, 2013	The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2100, establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to support political processes, protect civilians, and stabilize northern Mali after French and Malian forces pushed back militants.
2015-2016	Expansion of jihadist activity into central Mali (Mopti, Ségou)
March 2, 2017	Ansar Dine, al-Murabitun, the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and the Sahara Emirate subgroup of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) announced their merger, forming JNIM.
March, 2017	The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) split from its main affiliate and renamed itself the Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISIS-Sahel). This rebranding marked a strategic shift and expansion of ISIS's influence into the Liptako-Gourma region, encompassing parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
August 18, 2020	Colonel Assimi Goïta staged the first coup in Mali, arresting President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) and Prime Minister



	Boubou Cissé, which led to IBK's resignation and the dissolution of parliament.
May 24, 2021	Colonel Assimi Goïta led a second coup, ousting President Bah Ndaw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, and subsequently declared himself transitional president, consolidating control over the government.
January 24, 2022	First coup was staged in Burkina Faso to overthrow President Kaboré, leading to severe destabilization in the Sahel region and paving way for insurgencies to transcend. As a result of this, junta leader Damiba ascends into power.
March 27-31, 2022	Malian Armed Forces, supported by Russian Wagner Group mercenaries, conducted a military operation in the village of Moura, Mopti Region, killing over 300 civilians, marking it as one of the deadliest single atrocities in Mali's decade-long armed conflict.
August 15, 2022	The last French soldiers left Mali, effectively ending Operation Barkhane's nearly nine-year presence in the country.
September 30, 2022	A second coup was staged in Burkina Faso, overthrowing newly reigning President Damiba, causing instability and uncertainty in governance. As a result of the coup, Traoré comes to power.
10 June, 2023	Mali's Foreign Minister formally requested that the UN terminate the MINUSMA mission.
20 June, 2023	The United Nations Security Council officially ended MINUSMA's mandate.
July 26–28, 2023	President Bazoum was ousted by Tchiani in a coup staged in Niger, once again setting the stones for insurgencies to advance.
31 December, 2023	Full departure of all MINUSMA personnel from Mali, as required by the UN resolution.
May 3, 2025	Civilians took to the streets in Mali's first pro-democracy rallies since the 2021 coup. Demonstrators opposed the extended term and dissolution of parties.
May 13, 2025	Assimi Goïta, formally dissolved all political parties via declaration. This step followed a national political conference



	and brought along broader crackdowns on opposition and political activity.
June 11, 2025	The Council of Ministers approved a bill to extend the transitional civil period. Goïta's mandate declared five additional years, starting in 2025. This move, although controversial, revised the Transition Charter.

VI. Past Resolutions and Treaties

- [Resolution 2100 \(2013\)](#): Established in order to promote the political transition, stabilize the nation, safeguard people, and aid in the execution of the transitional roadmap in Mali. Although the resolution offered a presence for peacekeeping, the mission had difficulties because of persistent insurgencies and a lack of funding.
- [Resolution 2374 \(2017\)](#): Imposed sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, on individuals and entities threatening the peace, security, or stability of Mali. Sanctions were lifted on August 31, 2023, as a result of changing political conditions in Mali. They were intended to discourage destabilizing activity.
- [Resolution 2584 \(2021\)](#): The mandate of MINUSMA was extended, and the significance of safeguarding civilians and assisting the democratic transition was underlined. It persisted in peacekeeping efforts; however, the mission's effectiveness was diminished by the complex security environment.
- [Algiers Peace Accord \(2015\)](#): The primary objective of the Algiers Peace Accords were aimed to bring peace to northern Mali by addressing political, security, and development issues. The accord mainly led to the creation of the Platform alliance and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA); however, difficulties persisted and implementation became increasingly slow.
- [G5 Sahel Joint Force Agreement](#) (2017): The G5 Sahel Joint Force Agreement created a regional force to combat organized crime and terrorism throughout the Sahel, including Mali. The agreement hereby regulated regional cooperation; however, operational challenges and resource constraints limited its impact.

VII. Failed Solution Attempts

Although many persistent international and regional efforts to stabilize Mali have taken place, many unfortunately failed due to ongoing terror in the region. Among them have been the UN peacekeeping missions (MINUSMA), the 2015 Algiers Peace Accord, the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the French and Wagner military interventions, and the ECOWAS diplomatic movement. Each of these efforts has had distinct



objectives, approaches, and outcomes, highlighting both the complexity of the conflict and the difficulties of achieving lasting peace.

Established in 2013, MINUSMA was considered to be one of the UN'S most dangerous peacekeeping missions due to constant attacks and threats by regional insurgencies and extremist groups. MINUSMA's mandate focused on aiding the legislative process while also protecting civilians and promoting human rights in the region. While MINUSMA had succeeded to some extent in providing security to these regions, it struggled to protect and control violence where jihadists groups maintained strong influence.

On the other hand in 2015, the Algiers Peace Accord was negotiated between the Malian government and the Northern rebel groups consisting of the Tuareg factions and other militias. Their goal of decentralizing power, reintegrating combatants into society, and promoting fair legislation was considered to be slow and inconsistent. Many signatory groups remain dissatisfied, leading to fragmented compliance and continued insecurity. As a result of the accord, jihadist groups were not contemptuous of inclusivity and therefore retaliated.

Comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania, the G5 Sahel Joint Force was created in 2017 to enhance coordination and counter-terrorism operations within the Sahel region. Although the joint force had conducted a series of well regarded and mostly successful operations, it faced challenges of limited funding and therefore insufficient equipment, leading to the pause of its operations.

To stop Islamist gains in northern Mali, France initiated Operation Serval in 2013, which was eventually succeeded by Operation Barkhane. Although important cities have been retaken and insurgent capabilities have been diminished as a result of these deployments, Mali's public has become increasingly suspicious of foreign military participation. Similar to this, mercenaries from the Wagner Group have participated in training and military operations, but their actions have generated controversy because of purported human rights abuses and ambiguous goals, which has complicated domestic politics in Mali.

Among all, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has played a large diplomatic role in attempting to support political stability and buffer ongoing conflicts. Although ECOWAS has been successful in promoting communication, the uncertainty of Mali's political and security status limits its impact.

All things considered, these interventions show a combination of regional, political, and military tactics. Short-term security advantages have been made with the help of military intervention, but long-term peace has proven its fair share of hardships and shortcomings due to poor administration, ethnic divisions, and persistent terror strikes. Although regional and diplomatic initiatives have promoted communication, they often lack either funding, or the dialogue to advance.



VIII. Possible Solutions

To address Mali's prolonged instability, a comprehensive approach that combines diplomacy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian restoration is essential. Delegates must collaborate closely to develop constructive and forward-looking resolutions that integrate both humanitarian considerations and international legal principles. In line with the Rome Statute and the ICC framework, delegates should work toward establishing sustainable peacekeeping operations and anti-war crime mechanisms, supported by adequate funding to ensure long-term effectiveness. Member States should prioritize strengthening the Malian government and targeting insurgencies, while also pursuing accountability for corruption and war crimes through international courts such as the ICC, in coordination with ECOWAS allies. To achieve this, a multifaceted resolution must be drafted, incorporating reliable funding sources such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, while safeguarding Mali's economic independence. With secure funding, the mission could effectively continue and counter anti-democratic threats across the Sahel.

Beyond addressing security threats, peacekeeping missions must ensure protection for internally displaced persons by providing humanitarian shelters, medical supplies, and other essential resources. It is strongly recommended that humanitarian provisions be proposed separately from military measures, thereby invoking Article 377(V) of the UN General Assembly, which allows for an emergency special session if the Security Council fails to uphold its responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Once humanitarian and demilitarization measures are in place, ECOWAS partners must work to restore legitimacy in Mali's governmental institutions. This requires engaging local political actors alongside ICC officials to combat corruption and prosecute war crimes. As insurgencies weaken under the coordinated efforts of peacekeepers, government forces, and regional allies, development initiatives should focus on rebuilding infrastructure, expanding housing, and advancing legislative reforms. These combined efforts will help foster long-term stability, resilience, and democratic governance in Mali.

Once these technicalities are resolved, the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS must work together to revive Malian economic sectors such as agricultural and mineral fields. Agriculture would be a crucial aspect to ensure the reintegration of rural communities and provide them with a sustainable livelihood. On the other hand, newly and democratically elected governmental parties must establish a transparent mineral trading platform where all international trades are regulated in case of exploitation and unsafe working conditions. In order to achieve these goals, the Malian government must decentralize, giving electoral power to regional councils, spreading reliability and local initiatives. The Malian government, with the help of ECOWAS and AU allies, must begin training judges, lawyers, and law enforcement to ensure accountability and reduce impunity. Alongside this, they should ensure fair governance, supporting transparent, fair elections with international observers, ensuring that Mali's government regains legitimacy.



IX. Useful Links

[UN OCHA - Mali Review](#)

[MINUSMA – United Nations Peacekeeping Mission](#)

[Crisis Group – Mali](#)

[Center for Strategic and International Studies \(CSIS\) – Militancy and the Arc of Instability](#)

[International Rescue Committee \(IRC\) – Mali](#)

[Clingendael – The Roots of Mali's Conflict](#)

[ACLED – The Sahel, New Era of Decades Long Conflict](#)

[Global Conflict Tracker – Violent Extremism in The Sahel](#)

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